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Introduction 
Austerity, Mark Blyth argued, is a form of deflation in which the economy 
attempts to adjust through policies and legislation that reduce wages and welfare 
spending while increasing taxation, the rate of unemployment and precarious 
employment. It is part and parcel of a supply-side policy arrangement, the aim 
being the restoration of competitiveness or the improvement of it.1 In particular, 
austerity comes to the fore in times of crisis, because, under capitalism, the costs 
and losses from the crisis should be borne by the working classes and the 
deprived, not the rich and the prosperous. Yet, austerity does not manifest itself 
the same way in the core and the periphery. Peripheral states and societies within 
the Eurozone, such as Portugal and Greece, experience much harsher austerity 
regimes than the wealthier core, such as Germany or Holland. 
Improvement of competitiveness (and of the balance of payments) can also be 
assisted by currency (external) devaluation and a controlled rise in domestic 
inflation. However, this option does not exist within the European monetary 
union. The Eurozone states do not have monetary independence, the issuing 
institution of currency being the European Central Bank (ECB). Effectively, the 
Euro-zone is a fixed exchange rates system. Thus, austerity can only take the form 
of internal devaluation, given the no-bailout clause of the EU Treaties, in case an 
indebted Eurozone member is on the brink of default. The core argument I 
develop here is that the EU is not a state with a fiscal capacity and by virtue of it 
not being a state it disables all its members, especially Eurozone members, from 
being able to act as states with monetary sovereignty. This is, in my view, the 
darkest side of the European project and this is at the root of what Bob Jessop 
calls “the state of enduring austerity” in times of crisis.2  
                                                     
1 Cf., Mark Blyth, Austerity. The History of a Dangerous Idea, Oxford: O.U.P., 2013, pp.1-21, 51-95 and Wolfgang 
Streeck, How will Capitalism End? London: Verso, 2016, pp.73-164. 
2 Bob Jessop, “Financialisation, ordoliberalism, neo-liberalisation and the state of permanent austerity”, paper 
presented to the STAMP workshop on “Neo-liberalism and Ordoliberalism: One or Two Critiques?”, University 
of East London, London 12 December 2017 [mimeo] 
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But austerity is not just a form of public policy that dominates the EU/Eurozone. 
Austerity, by and large, is a neo-liberal policy linked to globalisation and the 
crisis of it. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to place austerity in a comparative public 
policy context that connects globalisation and its crisis with the process of 
European integration and its crisis. The concept of “new authoritarianism” I 
introduce here corresponds to the crisis of both neo-liberal globalisation and the 
crisis of ordoliberalism at EU level. In this respect, austerity is consubstantial 
with “new authoritarianism”. 
To achieve these aims, I first will shed light on Greece, by far the worst victim of 
the crisis. I will be looking at the social and economic consequences of the bailout 
austerity agreements imposed by the creditors. I will show that this is a form of 
rather formal, institutionalised imperialism. Second, I will offer some reflections 
as to why the EU/Euro-zone, far from representing a democratic aggregation of 
political agencies, is an ordoliberal construction operating under the 
disciplinarian-ordoliberal hegemony of Germany and, as such, it can never be 
expected to evolve into a democratic federal union. This, if at all, can be possible 
only as an outcome of social and political struggle. In this context, I shed light on 
two stylised and overlapping authoritarian policies, that of neo-liberal 
globalisation led by Anglo-American capitalist agencies and ordoliberalism, led 
by the German state. The aim is to achieve a deeper understanding of the German 
economic model and the extent to which it is being transplanted into the 
EU/Eurozone in an effort to compete globally with other regional assemblages in 
Asia and North America. 
Given the extraordinary amount of scholarly information we already have on the 
causes of the Greek/Eurozone crisis and the proposed ways out of it, I believe 
that this type of discussion is useful and moves the debate forward.   
The state of enduring austerity/“new authoritarianism” and its 
consequences  
Neo-liberal austerity regimes correspond to the crisis of neo-liberal globalisation 
set off in 2007-08 and, as such, are deeply authoritarian and undemocratic. From 
May 2010 to August 2015 Greece was forced to sign up to receive three bailout 
funds from its creditors corresponding to three “economic adjustment” 
programmes. However, whereas the programmes were and are being 
implemented without any major deviation creating very high primary surpluses 
at the expense of an impoverished Greek society, almost none of the funds 
disbursed trickled down to the real economic sector or contributed to any decrease 
of the public debt. Just a year before the first bailout, the debt/GDP ratio was at 
126.7%. After six years of harsh austerity, it soared up to 177.4% in 2015.  
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The first programme (2010) pushed the ratio of debt to GDP even higher at 
172.1%, whereas by 2013, that is after the second programme, it went further up 
to 177.4%. From 2009 to 2015 the country lost 26% of its GDP, effectively losing 
in less than six years all what it gained in the previous twelve. Despite the fact 
that public expenditure was reduced up to almost 16% of GDP during 2008-
2013,3 the fiscal deficit remained well above the benchmarks set at the Maastricht 
and Stability and Growth Pact Treaties. 
I will proceed by looking first at the impact of austerity/“new authoritarianism” 
of subaltern social classes, followed by an examination of the impact of austerity 
on dominant classes.  
Impact of austerity on subaltern classes 
The bailout agreements forced the Greek cabinets to a number of authoritarian 
measures: poll-tax and "solidarity tax" was introduced and VAT went up to 23%-
24%, including the islands, which enjoyed a lower VAT regime in order to 
encourage tourism (tourism's contribution to Greece's GDP stands at 18%). The 
underground economy also increased from 27% to 37% with some 6,000 firms 
owing to the Greek state more than 30bn Euros.4 Overdue debts of private firms 
and households is nearly 150bn Euros in 2016 of which 60bn are non-performing 
loans, 58.5bn overdue taxes, 27.4bn overdue social contributions, 3.7bn overdue 
customs and duties and 60bn overdue mortgage repayments. Evading paying 
VAT amounted to 6,5bn Euros per year. The real disposable income of Greek 
households has been deteriorating steadily since 2009, whereas the minimum 
wage was dropped down to the level of 2004. This represents a reduction by 22%, 
although to those under 25 the minimum wage is reduced by 32%. Also, the 
effects of the crisis and the bailout programmes induced capital flight. In 2012 
alone, wealthy individuals expatriated some 280bn Euros placing either in foreign 
banks, mainly German, Austrian, Swiss and British, or investing in housing and 
financial assets. Law 4024 of 2011 reduced the personal tax allowance from 
12,000 Euro a year to 5,000 with no effect as tax evasion continued becoming, 
effectively, a matter of survival for the impoverished.  
The “new authoritarianism” of austerity decimated the middle classes drawing 
onto society clear demarcation lines of class polarisation with immediate effects 
on the political and party system.5 The rise of Syriza to prominence is mainly 
                                                     
3 These are the highest cuts than any other country pursuing structural adjustment during that period, such as 
Ireland (11,3% cuts), Spain (5,9% cuts) and Portugal (2,7% cuts). See, Yiannis Tolios, The Transition to the 
“National Currency” (in Greek), Athens: Taksideutis, 2016, p.14.  
4 To Vima, 28 March 2016 and Kathimerini, 7 December 2015 and 2 February 2016. 
5 Among others, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine Dimoulas, “The Greek workshop of debt and the failure of 
the European project”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, v. 14, n.1, March 2012, pp.1-33 and 
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related to this social transformation, which is typical of a crisis of this magnitude 
and the social impoverishment and inequality it causes. In addition, a permanent 
fissure within Greek class structures is between those inside and outside of the 
workforce. Out of a total population of 10,920.000 in 2015, the economically 
active population, that is, those participating in workforce, are less than 40% 
(4,038.676 people), whereas the pensioners were more than 2,700.000 (Chart 1).  
 
Chart 1: Number of total employment, employees and pensioners in Greece. Source: Own 
compilation of data from ELSTAT (Hellenic Statistical Authority) 
 
 
Having been committed to the austerity of the bailout agreements, all Greek 
cabinets since 2010 engaged in pension cuts and other measures, such as 
gradually increasing the pensionable age to 70 years and complicating the 
eligibility criteria. However, due to GDP contraction, Greek pensions are still the 
higher in the EU as percentage of GDP, despite the fact that the minimum national 
pension has been reduced to 392 Euros per month.  
Law 3863 of 2010 introduced a new method in calculating the new pension: 
whereas before the final pension was defined by the best five years of 
contributions, the new law stipulated that the final pension results from the 
average sum of all contributions.  
                                                     
Alexander Kazamias, “The political effects of the Greek crisis”, in Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine Dimoulas 
(eds), Greece in the 21st Century; The Politics & Economics of a Crisis London: Routledge, 2018. 







Unemployment rate has always been below 12% since 1998 but it skyrocketed to 
27.5% in 2013. Youth (up to 24 years old) unemployment was the highest at 53% 
during 2012-2015. Long-term unemployment also increased from 34.7% in 2007 
to 41.9% in 2012, 70.5% in 2013 and 73.1% in 2014. Part-time, casual and 
precarious employment also increased, especially after the conversion of 
contracts from full-time to part-time and rotation work. Greek cabinets, acting 
under their creditors' diktat, introduced Law 4093 of 2012 in which annual leave 
became compartmentalised and the costs of hiring and firing workers was 
minimised. Experts estimate that there is an increase of 44.8% in the conversion 
of full-time into part-time contracts and an increase of 85.5% in the conversion 
of full-time contracts into rotation work.6 In 2013, youth involuntary part-time 
employment was over 64%.  
Figure 1: Evolution of main indicators concerning living standards in Greece, 2004-2015. 
Source: Our elaboration of data from Eurostat 
 
 
Further, Law 4046 of 2012 dismantled the structure of national collective 
bargaining introducing agreements at the level of enterprise. Already in 2010, 
some 200 sectoral agreements had been signed covering 80% of employees. By 
2015 even sectoral agreements ceased to be the norm: in 2015, there were only 
19 sectoral agreements, no national collective agreement, the rest being in-firm 
                                                     
6 Yianis Kouzis (in Greek), “Industrial relations, unreliability of enterprises and the threat of joblessness during 
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agreements most of which were between “group of workers” and the employer 
(the trade union was absent).  
The institutionalisation of the devaluation of labour-power via the deregulation 
of labour market is a substantial part of Greece's undemocratic “adjustment 
programme”. In these circumstances, informal employment and unemployment 
rose to over 30%. Due to high unemployment rate and precarious work, health 
insurance fees became unaffordable. Free health care for all was provided only 
by the second Syriza government in August 2015.7 Greece has now a distinct 
social group, that of the “new poor”, a social phenomenon quite common in 
Northern capitalist countries, which first appeared in Europe in Britain in the 
wake of Thatcher’s neo-liberal reforms. A substantial number of Greeks, 
especially pensioners, cannot afford to pay for a full meal a day and barter began 
to be widespread between 2011 and 2014, although it has now receded. More than 
4.000 people committed suicide for reasons related to personal financial 
difficulties. Researchers note that the rate of extreme deprivation peaked in 2013 
at 20% (it was 2.2% in 2009). The standard poverty rate increased from 19.1% in 
2009 to 44.3% in 2013, affecting mainly the unemployed, children and the 
pensioner.8  
Last but not least, the creditors pushed for reduction in public employment. They 
succeeded on that front too. In 2009, total employment in the broader public 
sector numbered 1,066.729 civil servants. By February 2013 it decreased to 
776,954 and this despite the fact that employment in Greece's public sector as a 
percentage of economically active population is below the average of OECD 
countries.9 Flexibility has also entered the domain of the public sector. Seasonal 
employment in health, education, local administration and various community 
services were abolished. Arguably, austerity in Greece has created unsustainable 
social conditions. 
Impact of austerity/“new authoritarianism” on dominant classes and foreign 
capital 
The structural reform aspect of all three adjustment programmes was not so 
disastrous for the dominant classes within Greece. It had had some strong class 
polarisation effects within the “historic bloc” ruling Greece since the fall of the 
                                                     
7 The creditors pushed for the reform of Greece's fragmented health care system. All health care funds came 
under a new supervisory agency, the so-called National Organisation for Primary Health Care (EOPYY) whose 
beneficiaries, according to its president in 2011, were 9 million people (the number was reduced to 6.2 million 
in 2013). The reform included initial payment of 25% of all medical costs (medicine, diagnostics tests etc.).  
8 See, Dionysis Balourdos and Maria Petraki (eds) (in Greek), Poverty in Greece. Trends, Challenges and Policies, 
Athens: National Centre for Social Research, 2012, pp.16, ff., Manos Matsaganis and Chryssa Levendi (in Greek), 
The Anatomy of Poverty in Greece in 2013, Athens: Public Policy Newsletter, 5, 2013.    
9 See, Ministry of Interior (in Greek), The Truth about the Greek Public Sector. Wages, Employment, Development, 
Athens: Ministry of Interior, 2016, p.11.  
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Colonels in 1974 supporting some class fractions against others, but it did not 
destroy capital nor did it damage the process of accumulation. It led to further 
concentration/centralisation of capital and intensified the rate of exploitation 
through deflation and punitive legislation.   
During the expansion period of 1995-2007, housing, transport, metal products, 
machinery and construction were the sectors that augmented most, whereas 
capital formation in agriculture remained rather stable. As it can be seen from the 
evolution of gross capital formation (figure 2), investments after 2007 began 
falling. By 2015, the gross capital formation was reduced by two-thirds reaching 
the level of 1995, losing all the gains it achieved during the expansion years of 
1995-2007. The value of lost capital was nearly 80% in housing, metal products 
and machinery, whereas agriculture stagnated (see also below). In Chart 2, we 
can see all main macroeconomic indicators over the eight-year period of 2006-
2014. All of them, with the sole exception of fixed capital consumption which 
remained rather stable, have since 2008 deteriorated. 
Figure 2: Evolution of gross capital formation in Greece, 1996-2015. Source: Own 
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The real net profits grew throughout the expansion period, reaching their peak in 
2007, although if we trace the data back to 1980 we discern some fluctuations for 
short periods of time. The economic expansion led to further 
concentration/centralisation of capital, especially in banking, shipping, 
construction, the media sector and tourism. This trend was further intensified after 
2010, that is, when Greece entered the era of permanent austerity. Infrastructural 
work, such as the Rio-Antirio bridge, the construction of the new Athens airport 
and works for the 2004 Athens Olympics had been financed by heavy external 
and domestic borrowing. When the crisis hit the Greek economy and hot 
speculation attacked the Greek bond and repo markets, the shaky foundations of 
the Greek expansion unravelled. All main macro-economic indicators contracted, 
the sole exception being that of fixed capital, leaving no space for recovery under 
this type of deflationary/authoritarian policy.                    
Chart 2: Main macro-economic indicators in Greece, 2006-2014. Source: Our elaboration of 
data from ELSTAT 
 
 
Interestingly, however, only 18 out of 500 leading enterprises in Greece in 2013 
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austerity years of 2012-2014, especially the banks.10 Twenty profitable 
conglomerates represented 67,6% of all profits in 2013 and controlled 43,8% of 
the annual payroll of those 500 enterprises. Profits in the banking sector alone 
totalled 63,5% of all profits recorded, whereas tourism registered 36%. Greece's 
small manufacturing sector recorded 13% profit, but this covered only 166 firms. 
In retail, 99 firms covered 8,6% of all profits, although the number of the firms 
was reduced in 2014 due to bankruptcies and acquisitions.  
According to data gathered from Greek national accounts, the sectors affected 
most from the crisis were the most dynamic ones, simply because they had 
borrowed heavily. Small family enterprises lost 58.2% of their added value, 
constructions 52%, social work 45,9%, communication and information services 
40.3% and transport and warehousing 38.5%.11 Other authors also report that 
large, long-established firms, such as Nutriat ABEE, declared bankruptcy in 
2013. Greece's largest furniture company, NEOSET, employing over 1,000 
workers, declared bankruptcy in 2012, as did SATO, another furniture 
manufacturer.12 It should be noted that Greece's private sector is dominated by 
SMEs of which 98% employ less than 10 workers.  
Lastly, we can see from Chart 4 that FDI inflows in Greece were dominated by 
German capital (from the late 1940s to early 1980s Greece was dominated by US 
capital). Before the crisis, the rate of investment was satisfactory. The amount of 
foreign capital invested in Greece during 2003-2008 was 28,4bn Euros of which 
one-third was German (9,1bn). The average annual investment ranged from 3,4bn 
to 7bn, but in 2012 it was only 2bn. Unsurprisingly, FDI inflows decreased after 
2009. But the most interesting feature has to do with the type of FDI Greece 
experienced since the country entered neo-liberal financialisation/globalisation in 
the mid-1990s. 
According to “Enterprise Greece”, a key professional agency recording FDI in 
Greece, during 2003-2008, 71% (19,9bn) of FDI went to the tertiary sector of the 
economy, more specifically, to finance (33%) and telecommunications (41%). 
Investment in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and manufacturing was almost 
zero.13 From 2009 to 2014, FDI was also directed to services (70% or 11,9bn), 
with the breakdown now being 29% to telecommunications, 24% in finance, 18% 
to the devalued real-estate and 155 to the retail sector. All in all, FDI did not 
                                                     
10 See, Yiannis Tolios (in Greek), The Transition to the “National Currency”, op.cit., pp.27ff., passim; Lefteris 
Tsouflidis and Michel Zoumboulakis (in Greek), Greek Sovereign Defaults in Retrospect and Prospect, MPRA 
Paper No. 71588, 26 May 2016; Marica Frangakis, Inequality and Financialization: the Case of the EU, Berlin: 
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, April 2014.  
11 See, www.statistics.gr (accessed on 28 December 2017) 
12 See, Marica Frangakis, “Public debt crisis, austerity and deflation: the case of Greece” In: Review of Keynesian 
Economics, 3 (2015/3): p.307. 
13 Enterprise Greece, http://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/gr/h-ellada-shmera/giati-ellada/ksenes-ameses-
ependyseis, Accessed on 26 December 2017.  
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contribute to the development of the real economic sector in Greece. Its business 
concentrated in the acquisition of equities and shares and the floating assets of 
Greece’s privatising companies (portfolio investment). 
Chart 3: Origin of inward FDI, Greece (2003-2014). Source: Own elaboration of data from 
the Bank of Greece 
 
 
As far as the agricultural sector is concerned, it shrank from 8% of GDP in 1995 
to 3,1% in 2009 and it began a gentle pick up with the advent of the crisis, when 
some internal migration took place as people, due to the crisis, was forced to leave 
the urban centres, returning to their provinces of origin. Remarkably, though, the 
EU's CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) did not manage to offset any of the 
chronic problems of the Greek agricultural sector, namely its labour-intensive 
character and uncompetitive position (Greece's agricultural sector is dominated 
by small, family-based farms). If at all, its financing mechanism widened the gap 
between small and large firms and increased relatively the number of seasonal 
workers. The overall number of farms, nevertheless, declined from 860,154 in 
2007 to 709,449 in 2013.14 
                                                     
14 Spiros Sakellaropoulos (in Greek), Crisis and Social Stratification in Greece in the 21st Century (in Greek). 













Preliminary discussion and context 
On the basis of the above factual analysis, one may rush to conclude that the harsh 
austerity regime described represents the dark, indeed the darkest, side of the 
European project as it applies to the case of Greece. After all, as the creditors 
along with all sorts of neo-liberals have argued, austerity in Greece is the 
necessary outcome of state profligacy, recklessness and the low labour 
productivity of the real economic sector. The German Minister of Finance from 
28 October 2009 to 24 October 2017, Wolfgang Schäuble, put it as follows: “It is 
an undisputable fact that excessive state spending has led to unsustainable levels 
of debt and deficits (...). Governments in and beyond the Euro-zone need not just 
to commit to fiscal consolidation and improved competitiveness: they need to 
start delivering now”. Schäuble argued that this is the only way to achieve 
sustainable development and took a clear position against a fiscal union at the 
European level because, as he wrote, it would make the crisis worse by “removing 
a key incentive for the weaker members to forge ahead with much-needed 
reforms”. After all, he continued, the fiscal union is “against the very nature of 
European integration”.15   
The Minister’s analysis is wrong. As we have shown elsewhere, the Eurozone 
crisis is not a fiscal crisis. It is a balance of payments cum profitability crisis and, 
as such, its roots go back to the breakdown of the Keynesian compromise in the 
1970s and the end of the fixed exchange rate system centred on the primacy of 
the dollar in global currency markets.16 The profitability crisis in the real 
economic sector that began in the 1970s in the Anglo-American world, failed to 
be restored via the policy of neo-liberal financialisation/globalisation and when 
the latter imploded in 2007-08 it immediately trickled down to the Eurozone via 
the banking sector. The first banks that failed were German and French banks.   
The Minister is also wrong in saying that a fiscal union is impossible because it 
constitutes a bad example for the “weaker members” to implement the “much-
needed reforms”, whose consequences I have described above. One of the reasons 
why the former Minister does not wish a fiscal union is because such an event 
would force the rich countries of the core, and first and foremost Germany, to 
cancel the debt of the periphery and then pay for it. But debt forgiveness is 
impossible not just because the Treaties disallow this but because such a move 
would destabilise the political and fiscal systems of the core countries, leading to 
                                                     
15 Wolfgang Schäuble, <<Why austerity is the only cure for the Euro-zone>>, Financial Times, 5 September 
2011. 
16 Among others, Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence London: Verso, 2006; Vassilis K. Fouskas 
and Constantine Dimoulas, Greece, Financialisation and the EU. The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction 
London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013; Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay, The Fall of the US Empire. 
Global Fault-lines and the Shifting Imperial Order London: Pluto press, 2012; Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble 
London: Verso, 1999. 
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major social upheavals and, eventually, a break-up of the EU. The interesting part 
of the lecture, however, is when Schäuble says that, after all, fiscal union is 
against the “very nature” of the European project. This begs the question: which 
is the very nature of European integration?  
I argue that the “very nature” of European integration are the guiding principles 
of it. These are premised upon German-Austrian ordoliberal principles, which 
have been inserted in the institutional materiality of the European Treaties, 
reflecting more or less the German model of a peculiar capitalist-imperial rule. 
As a form of public policy, ordoliberalism dominated the process of European 
integration, dictating rules and norms across Europe in a typical imperialist 
fashion. As such, it does not aim at politically and fiscally uniting Europe and, 
after all, the “political” unification of Europe is provided by the USA under the 
security umbrella of NATO.  
It is in this respect that Schäuble is correct: fiscal union is “against the very nature 
of European integration”. However, we need now to have a closer look at the 
main ingredients of ordoliberalism and the way in which it overlaps with Anglo-
American globalisation, another key imperialist policy. Thus, from this broader 
perspective, I would argue that austerity in Greece and elsewhere in Europe, 
including Germany itself, is not the dark side of European integration. It is, 
nevertheless, the result and the epiphenomenon of a deep historical crisis of the 
Western imperial system that began in the late 1960s and has become more visible 
and manifest after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of the USA to 
control the Russian and Chinese states in the 1990s. In other words, it is connected 
to the power-shift to Asia and the new emerging economies centred on Chinese 
imperialism.  
Two overlapping, yet stylised, authoritarianisms: Anglo-American neo-
liberalism and German ordoliberalism 
On the one hand, the “success” of Anglo-American neo-liberalism, its financial 
sites being the Wall Street and the City of London as offshore money-hubs par 
excellence, rested on excessive financial operations at home and abroad; 
excessive speculative arbitrage; excessive re-cycling of fictitious capital 
appropriating international value creating the “debt-driven” growth of the 1990s 
and early 2000s; and excessive production of legislation and norms at both 
national and global levels aiming, among others, at transplanting their politico-
economic and ideational models of neo-liberal policies across the globe. In the 
relevant codified jargon, the names given to these imperial processes were (and 
are) “structural adjustment programmes”, “rule of law” and, in the case of 
embattled peripheries and war zones, “transitional justice” or “Washington 
consensus”. The aim was and remains the transformation of the domestic orders 
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of all capitalist states in the world and the appropriation of international value: 
these are the two key features of any imperialist project in modern capitalist 
history. These activities, it should be said, coupled with military interventions in 
key neuralgic areas of the globe, have spectacularly failed to regulate the 
structural contradictions of capital despite the indisputable defeat of the labour 
movement in the 1980s. In addition, they failed to arrest the slow and protracted 
decline of the Western economies as a whole. 
 
On the other hand, the “success” of German-Austrian ordoliberalism rested on 
the victory of the economic model of “social market economy”, which Germany 
managed to transpose onto the EEC/EC/EU and even beyond, and after having 
prevailed over France, especially after Francois Mitterrand’s famous U-turn in 
1983. The (secret and open) negotiations between French and German 
delegations from the 1960s onwards over the thorny issue of EMU and the 
monetarist-ordoliberal criteria firmly enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty secured 
Germany’s hegemony in the EU. This negotiating process, so vividly described 
by Kevin Featherstone and Ken Dyson in their classic, The Road to Maastricht, 
tells us how Germany’s economic model came to prevail, defining the process 
and the principles upon which Europe’s economic Constitution and institutional 
rules should be build.17 Time and again, as with the Anglo-American neo-
imperial design, the aim of German-Austrian ordoliberalism is the transformation 
of the domestic environment of European states making it conform to their own 
ordoliberal socio-economic model.  
 
This brief sketch alone suffices to define both public policies as inherently 
authoritarian and imperial, two dimensions that unfolded during their crisis that 
set off in 2007-08. But there are more reasons militating in favour of such a 
characterisation. As we saw earlier, the global financial crisis of 2007-08 
penetrated the Euro-zone via the banking sector. Neo-liberal globalisation and the 
ordoliberal integration process of the EU are strictly intertwined. German and 
French banks, exposed to toxic financial commodities from the USA and Britain, 
were the first to fail. Germany's economy has one of the highest degrees of 
financialization/globalisation in the EU. But Germany, having frozen wages from 
the mid-to-late 1990s onwards, became the top exporting country in the Euro-
zone amassing and recycling large surpluses at the expense of the periphery. 
Thus, she was in a position to displace the crisis of its failing banking sector and 
impose an austerity agenda especially on the indebted periphery of the Euro-zone, 
effectively bailing out its failing banks.18 Thus, in the wake of the bailout 
                                                     
17 Kevin Featherstone and Kenneth Dyson, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union 
Oxford: O.U.P, 1999. 
18 Among others, Yanis Varoufakis, Adults in the Room. My Battle with Europe's Deep Establishment London: The 
Bodley Head, 2017; and my review of the book in The Political Quarterly, v.88, n.4, 2017. 
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agreements that passed the debt from the private onto public institutions, it is now 
the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese taxpayer bailing out the banks of the core. 
 
Three issues are important here. First, the crisis in the Euro-zone spread from the 
Anglo-American financial core as a crisis of the imperialism of neo-liberal 
financialisation: this was a crisis of the function of core-core interpenetrative 
transatlantic financial transactions. Second, Germany's deflationist agenda, 
inspired by an ordoliberal public policy, failed to protect its own economy, and 
that of the EU/Euro-zone, from this Anglo-American driven global financial 
crisis, indicating failure of ordoliberal public policy to insulate the Eurozone. 
Third, and given the nonchalant growth rates of the Euro-zone and the EU as a 
whole from the 1980s onwards, German “social market” principles failed to 
deliver sustainable growth, especially under EMU conditions. Austerity and 
growth are two irreconcilable magnitudes.19 However, what is of relevance for 
our purposes here is also the extent to which Germany’s ordoliberal public policy 
is imperialist. To answer this question, we must understand the profound policy 
meaning and determinants of ordoliberalism and how it operates in the EU/Euro-
zone and beyond. 
 
Ordoliberalism is what others call “social market economy” or “The Freiburg 
School”. Effectively, it is the German-Austrian version of neo-liberal economics. 
It emanated from academic circles during the inter-war period and influenced 
policy-making after the war. Ordoliberal Alfred Müller-Armack, a member of the 
Nazi party during the inter-war period, was Germany’s chief negotiator for the 
Treaty of Rome (1957). The literature that examines the way in which ordoliberal 
principles and rules have dominated the process of European integration 
becoming Treaty-bound norms and legal obligations for all member-states, 
especially Euro-zone members, is now vast.20 As we saw earlier, the argument 
advanced is that Germany, following decades of (secret and open) negotiations 
primarily with France, has managed to transplant into the institutional 
architecture of the EU key policy tenets of its economic-institutional model, 
creating a pan-European system of supranational governance that resembles 
                                                     
19 Vassilis K. Fouskas and Shampa Roy-Mukherjee (2016), “Austerity and growth in Europe: Germany's impossible 
mission”, Croatian Political Science Review, v.53, n.4, pp.7-29 
 
20 Among others, Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics New York: Palgrave, 1979/2010; Andrew Gamble, The 
Free Economy and the Strong State London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1988; Derick Dale and Nadine El-Enany, "The 
Limits of Social Europe: EU law and the ordoliberal agenda", German Law Journal, v.14, n.5, 2013, pp.613-649; 
Kevin Featherstone and Kenneth Dyson, The Road to Maastricht, op.cit.; Bob Jessop, The State Cambridge: Polity 
press, 2015; Michael Wilkinson, "The spectre of authoritarian liberalism: reflections on the constitutional crisis 
of the European Union", German Law Journal, v.14, n.5, 2013, pp. 527-560. Foucault was the first tackling the 
ordoliberal phenomenon in some depth. In England, I should point out the pioneering essay by Andrew Gamble 




Germany’s model of capitalism. This model is based on the following inter-
related principles: 
 
A) Anti-inflation bias, balanced budgets and a monetary policy protecting 
the Euro.  
B) Central bank independence.  
C) De-politicisation of economic policy-making and technocratic 
quantification of it.  
D) Anti-trust legislation and a rigid rule-making economic constitution 
inserted in Treaties and buttressed by an ensemble of “federated 
executives”.21  
 
This last point, in many respects, resembles the design of Friedrich Hayek in his 
rather forgotten essay, “The Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism”, 
who wrote in 1939.22 Wolfgang Streeck goes as far as to say that all major 
European institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, the Council of Europe and even the European Court of Justice are 
forms of authoritarian governance protecting European free markets from 
democratic interference.23 A similar point of view from a juridical-philosophical 
perspective is developed by William E. Scheuerman.24 From this perspective, the 
very meaning of the rule of law in conditions of ordoliberal (and neo-liberal) 
financialisation, in both the metropolises and the peripheries of capitalism, has 
nothing to do with justice, democracy, rights and civilization as liberal theorising 
in the field of international politics wants us to believe. “Rule of law” (for the 
core) and ideologies of “transitional justice” (for the embattled peripheries of the 
global South) are embodiments of the technocratic rules that the individual of a 
fragmenting neo-liberal society, at home and abroad, must internalise so that it 
can be inserted without any resistance to the supreme rule and disciplinarian 
realm of capital accumulation, expansion, coercion and “free” global markets. 
Working class family units and, with them, the Fordist wage, have to be 
undermined because they are not conducive to the devaluation of labour-power 
through the market mechanism, whereas they over-burden the fiscal component 
of the state. The “new citizen” in the West and the East, North and South, must 
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feel co-responsible with the “entrepreneur” in a society in which the workers-
consumers of both sexes are no longer defined contractually as employees but as 
associates, with no rights whatsoever while accepting ridiculously low wages and 
harsh working conditions.25 This is what Michel Foucault, who tackled the 
ordoliberal/neo-liberal phenomenon as early as the late 1970s and somewhat 
juxtaposed it with the Anglo-American neo-liberalism of the “Chicago School”, 
called bio-politics, after what ordoliberals called Vitalpolitik. According to 
Foucault, without this bio-political dimension, which effectively summarises a 
new life-style and a way of life, the ordoliberal project may not succeed.26 
 
These analyses should be read in tandem with contemporary events in various EU 
states and the impact of the Euro-zone crisis. In order to crack down on acts of 
terror, EU states impose, one after the other, “states of emergency” reinforcing 
the executive-authoritarian arm of the state, which acts already in an authoritarian 
manner by way of imposing austerity and welfare retrenchment. Whereas Anglo-
American neo-liberalism is consubstantial with globalisation and the dominance 
of American-led finance since the 1980s in an increasingly securitised global 
environment after 9/11, ordoliberalism is consubstantial with the process of 
European "integration", the management of its current crisis and the hegemonic 
posture of Germany in those processes. Same as neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism, 
too, has an authoritarian core which is centred on the disciplinarian, de-politicised 
and technocratic rule-binding approach to the construction of the EU, a policy 
approach implemented by the federated executives of member-states in a 
completely undemocratic manner.27 
 
All in all, the public policy of ordoliberal financialisation that guides the process 
of European “integration” and manages its crisis via harsh austerity regimes is a 
clear-cut imperialist policy. Apart from the Single Market mechanism, imperial 
arrangements of value transfer from the periphery to the core were 
institutionalised in the EU well before the current crisis and the launch of the Euro 
in 1999 (2001 for Greece). Appropriation of value by the core became more 
pronounced during the crisis, especially in peripheral countries, such as Greece. 
The announcement by the European Central Bank in October 2017 that it has so 
far made €7.8bn in profits from its Greek bond holdings reveals the true imperial 
nature of the so-called “bailouts” of Greece that EU (read: German-Austrian 
ordoliberalism) and IMF (read: Anglo-Anglo-American neo-liberalism) policy-
makers organised in return for massive austerity measures from 2010 onwards.28 
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Discussion and context             
Since the 1980s, austerity has become the dominant form of socio-economic 
policy in the West.29 At the European level, one can find it enshrined in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, 1998), both of 
which aimed, among others, at streamlining the budgetary process of the member-
states in order to optimise monetary integration by avoiding currency crises and 
minimising risk. Exchange rate stabilisation was paramount for all core European 
states and the USA as it facilitated trade and transatlantic integration under 
American primacy. Austerity was thus institutionalised in the EU policy regimes 
well before the onset of the global financial crisis and the Euro-zone crisis in 
2008-09. Austerity is enshrined as a key policy norm in the supply-side 
economics of both neo-liberalism and ordoliberalism. What happened after the 
crisis, especially in the beleaguered periphery of the EU, was the severe 
intensification of austerity; intensification of operationalisation of existing 
ordoliberal rules and norms embedded in the Treaties; introduction of new rules 
and norms and intensification of their implementation. This was to be expected 
because the ruling financial and political elites of the West, contrary to the way 
their predecessors reacted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 1929, 
took the strategic decision not to alter the principle upon which globalisation and 
European integration has been developing since the 1980s, namely, that of 
continuous support for the supply-side of the social economy and the embedded 
regime of austerity in it. In the wake of the Euro-zone crisis, new, stricter versions 
of the SGP came into force in the form of “European Semester” and “Fiscal 
Compact” programmes. 
Austerity takes different forms and intensity levels in different countries. This is 
because capitalism, as a (global) social system, is developing in an uneven way. 
It is very important to recognise this, because it challenges head-on neo-liberal 
policy. This approach brushes aside uneven development and core-periphery 
dynamics in which public and private agencies of the core extract rents and profits 
from peripheral countries via value transfer mechanisms. Imperialism is 
appropriation of international value and this can happen via a variety of means 
and methods. In the context of the EU/Euro-zone, this can take the form of 
recycling of the surpluses of the core and the financialization of various 
commercial transactions. For neo-liberals, imbalances and asymmetries are seen 
at the state level alone and should be rectified at that level, because state 
                                                     
 
29 There are exceptions, such as the Scandinavian countries. But Greece, too, had not been served by austerity 
cabinets in the 1980s and early 1990s, although there were strong factions within the ruling parties of PASOK 
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Political Economy of Debt and Destruction, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013, pp.109-133.  
18 
 
profligacy is the culprit. External disequilibria, such as current account deficits 
reflecting developmental cleavages, are disregarded. In short, in order to use the 
state executive as an instrument of austerity par excellence, core states, offload 
the debt resulting from structural asymmetries and monetary and trade 
interactions onto the peripheral state. Democracy and elections do not matter. The 
European Union is not a state and the member-states of the Eurozone do not have 
the right to oppose austerity even if their electorates wished to do so. In this 
context, I argue that there is no state, whether at European or national level, to 
host democracy and democratic procedures. Legitimisation comes via coercion 
In the Greek case of summer 2015, the ECB stopped providing liquidity to the 
Greek banking system, forcing the left-wing, anti-bailout government of Syriza 
to capitulate. 
Austerity in Greece took an unprecedented form. This is because Greece was the 
worst of all peripheral countries in terms of both internal (budget deficit) and 
external liabilities (current account deficit). As a result, the crisis took a very 
acute form. Under the treble discipline of the IMF, the ECB and the EU, Greek 
cabinets have since 2010 pursued a most peculiar and acute form of bondage, that 
of internal devaluation, and by way of accepting a direct colonial regime within 
Greece proper. The crisis in Greece revealed that even specific departments and 
branches of the Greek state are controlled directly by the creditors, or the “troika” 
(ECB, IMF EU). For example, when Yanis Varoufakis tried to test his “Plan B” 
when he was Minister in January-July 2015, he found out that even the General 
Secretariat for the Public Revenue based in his Ministry of Finance was 
controlled by the creditors, who refused to provide him with the tax codes he 
wanted in case Greece's negotiations with the troika failed.30 This resembles 
aspects of formal-colonial imperialism of the 19th century.   
Having said this, “dependency” may no longer be an adequate term to describe 
Greece's position in the international and European capitalist system. During the 
Cold War, core-periphery theories of international relations and political 
economy used the term to describe the political and economic control of the 
periphery by core imperial powers, chiefly the USA. The collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, the ordoliberal process of European integration and the relative decline of 
the USA have led to the advancement of new forms of governance and rule of the 
periphery by the core at the European level, effectively reducing to zero even the 
minimal relative autonomy they used to enjoy during the Cold War. Apart from 
the forms of political dependency that are clear and need no further explanation, 
one should consider the total loss of monetary sovereignty of all countries that 
are either members of the Euro-zone or have their currencies pegged to the Euro. 
Thus, in periods of crisis in which the terrain of structural contradictions sharpens 
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dissipating any liberal ideological pretext of “equality” and “solidarity” and 
makes all actors appear in clearly defined class terms and roles, one can 
distinguish clearly the imperial from the subaltern. In this class equation, imperial 
forces forge a subordinate merging of the executive of the subaltern state with 
the imperial-dictating posture of the dominant state, creating a unique form of 
governance for which I would reserve the term of symphysis.  
Concluding remarks 
I have examined the social and economic consequences of the “adjustment 
programmes” imposed on Greece by the EU, the ECB and the IMF. Subaltern 
classes in Greece were the main losers, the winners being select Greek business 
elites and the banking system of the core. Arguably, however, this is not the dark 
side of European integration but a symptom of broader historical and structural 
processes in Western capitalist economies. Austerity in Greece and everywhere 
should be placed in the context of the crisis of neo-liberal globalisation (led by 
the USA) and ordoliberal European integration (led by Germany). I have argued 
that what Bob Jessop calls “a state of enduring austerity” is an epiphenomenon 
of the neo-liberal, supply-side authoritarian turn of western capitalist economies 
as a whole, a turn aiming at arresting the profitability crisis of the 1970s. 
However, the project failed in both of its dimension, the Anglo-American neo-
liberalism and the German-led ordoliberalism. Both public policies failed to 
advance long-term sustainable growth regimes; protect capitalism from crises; 
and arrest and reverse the slow and protracted decline of Western economies as a 
whole that ushered in with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 
late 1960s. 
I have also examined the key features of neo-liberal globalisation and 
ordoliberalism and argued that they are both authoritarian and imperialist 
policies. German-led ordoliberalism, in particular, constitutes an authoritarian 
regime of binding norms that become truly unbearable and undemocratic in times 
of crisis. Specific departments of the Greek state are controlled directly by the 
creditors depriving it of any meaningful (relative) autonomy. Democracy has 
become meaningless in Greece, and surely in many other parts of the 
EU/Eurozone, because the state policy is the result of the institutionalisation of 
the merging of the “national” (the Greek/X European government), the 
“European” (the EU and the ECB) and the “global” (IMF) into an executive 
committee, regardless of liberal-democratic processes taking place within Greece 
or any other member-state. But the EU is not a federal state and the Greek state 
cannot act as a democratic state under Eurozone conditions. It cannot, for 
example, devalue its currency in order to improve competitiveness. Thus, 
democracy does not exist not just because neo-liberalism is inherently 
authoritarian, but because there is nowhere a state to host it.  
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The solution to this unique historical phenomenon created by global and 
European banking and financial interests are two: either an orderly break-up of 
the Eurozone and return to the status quo ante; or an orderly break-up of the 
ordoliberal rule and the advancement towards a political European Union. Both 
perspectives can only be the outcome of social struggle not just between the elites 
and the subaltern classes, but also among factions of the liberal-financial 
bourgeoisie themselves. Given the rise of China and the new assertive security 
positioning of Russia in key geo-strategic parts of Eurasia and the Middle East, 
both perspectives are pregnant with geopolitical risks about which this 
contribution reserves the right not to pass judgement. 
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